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NOTES & COMMENTS
Sperm Plus Egg Equals One "Boiled" Debate:
Kass v. Kass and The Fate of the
Frozen Pre-Zygotes,
INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades, medical and scientific advances in the
field of assisted reproductive technologies ("ART") have pro-
ceeded at a rapid pace. Two methods in particular - in vitro fertili-
zation ("IVF") 2 and embryo cryopreservation 3 - have introduced
into the American legal system unique issues never before contem-
plated concerning the legal status, the ownership, and the rights to
control the disposition of IVF-created and cryopreserved pre-zy-
gotes.4 Unfortunately, the courts addressing these issues have little
I Throughout this Comment, the term "pre-zygote" will be used in the same
context as "pre-embryo," "embryo," and "fertilized egg," with each term referring
to the cryogenically-preserved product of IVF. See Lucinda L. Veeck,
Cryopreservation of Embryos/Eggs, in 2 REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY,
SURGERY, AND TECHNOLOGY 2353, 2355 (Eli Y. Adashi et al. eds., 1996)
(providing precise definitions of the terms "pre-zygote," "pre-embryo," and
"embryo").
2 IVF involves the fertilization of eggs by sperm, accomplished outside the
mother's body, with the resulting pre-embryo transferred into the woman's womb
to attempt to achieve a pregnancy. STEDMAN'S MED. DICrIONARY 573 (25th ed.
1990). In essence, the IVF process duplicates the natural fertilization process that
occurs within a woman's fallopian tube. Id. The IVF procedure will be discussed
in detail in Part I-A.
3 Cryopreservation, a technique for preserving biological materials at ex-
tremely low temperatures, enables fertilized eggs to be maintained for long periods
outside of the body. Id. at 375. The process and benefits of cryopreservation will
be discussed in detail in Part I-B.
4 See John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027,
1045-50 (1994) (presenting a variety of legal issues raised when IVF created em-
bryos are frozen for future implantation). See generally J.B. v. M.B., 751 A. 2d
613, 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding that a wife's wish to destroy
frozen embryos created during the couple's marriage was not outweighed by the
husband's wish to preserve them for future use with another woman, or in the
alternative, "for donation to an infertile couple"); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E . 2d 1051,
1054, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (although a divorcing couple executed an informed con-
sent form awarding the wife custody of the frozen embryos in the event of a di-
vorce, the court granted custody of the frozen embryos to the husband; the court
reasoned that "[e]nforcing the form... would require [the husband] to become a
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or no legal precedent to follow in rendering their decisions. 5 Fed-
eral legislation, providing uniform laws regarding disputes over pre-
zygote ownership, is non-existent.6 Few states have adopted legisla-
tion addressing the novel issues concerning ART.7 And finally,
case law development is slow and, most often, inconsistent.8 As a
result, judicial decisions in this subject area have been somewhat
difficult to make. 9
Kass v. Kass,10 a case of first legal impression in New York,1"
involved a dispute between a divorced couple 12 to determine who
had disposition rights over five cryopreserved pre-zygotes formed
during their marriage. 13 As this dispute proceeded through the
parent over his ... objection); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert.
denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 911 (1993); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 422 (E.D.
Va. 1989) (a case of first impression involving a dispute between a couple and a
doctor concerning the ownership of IVF created embryos).
5 See Marvin F. Milich, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medical
Technology + Social Values = Legislative Solutions, 30 J. FAM. L. 875, 888-90
(1991) (noting that the federal government and the states regulate the IVF proce-
dure and fetal experimentation, but not disputes concerning the disposition of fro-
zen embryos). See generally J.B., 751 A. 2d 613; A.Z., 725 N.E. 2d 1051; Davis, 842
S.W. 2d 588; York, 717 F. Supp. 421.
6 See Robyn Shapiro, Who Owns Your Frozen Embryo?, Promises and Pit-
falls of Emerging Reproductive Options, 25 SPG HUM. RTS., 12, 24 (Spring 1998)
(concluding that the virtual nonexistence of reproductive regulation may be due to
the "politically charged nature of the issue of [ART]," the rate at which scientific
advances are proceeding, or the special interest placed upon the individual's right
to privacy in procreative choice).
7 See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 71-84, 99-212 and accompanying text.
9 See generally J.B., 751 A. 2d 613; A.Z., 725 N.E. 2d 1051; Davis, 842 S.W.
2d 588; York, 717 F. Supp. 421, 422.
10 Kass v. Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), rev'd
663 N.Y.S. 2d 581 (2d Dep't 1997), affd 696 N.E. 2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
11 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174, 175 (describing the issue as "the first
such dispute to reach [the] Court"). At the time Kass v. Kass was decided, there
was only one case that set out an analytical framework in an attempt to resolve
disputes between divorcing couples regarding the disposition of frozen pre-zy-
gotes. See generally Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, *1 (Tenn. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990), af-id 842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 911
(1993); see also Raymond Hernandez, Court Blocks Use of Embryos Without Ex-
Husband's Consent, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1998, at B3 (noting the significance of this
decision, the N.Y. Times immediately reported the Kass decision).
12 For simplicity, this Comment will refers to IVF participants as couple(s),
spouses, or as husband and wife. However, there is no biological reason for IVF
participants to be married.
13 See Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174.
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New York State judicial system, with little statutory or other legal
precedent, each court level struggled to find a solution to this
unique case. 14 On May 7, 1998, the New York Court of Appeals, in
a landmark decision, ruled that a written contract executed between
the divorced couple and the IVF clinic is enforceable. 15 At the
same time, the Court also concluded that the provisions in the
agreement would govern the disposition rights of the couple inter
se.16
Whereas some courts and legislatures have focused on whether
a cryopreserved pre-zygote is considered property, 17 a person, 18 or
entitled to special respect, 19 New York's highest court focused on
none of these three views.20 Instead, the Court, in an effort to
avoid ruling on the legal status of the frozen pre-zygotes, relied
upon, and rested its decision on the laws of contract to settle this
dispute.21 The Court reasoned that the clear intent of the couple,
set forth in a pre-divorce consent document, should control the fate
of their cryopreserved pre-zygotes.22 Finally, the Court also held
that the judicial system should not interfere with a couple's private
disposition of jointly created frozen pre-zygotes since their disposi-
tion is inherently a private matter.2 3 As a result, the Court of Ap-
peals granted the ex-husband's request to have the frozen pre-
zygotes donated to the IVF clinic for research purposes.2 4
This Comment discusses disputes between once-married
spouses concerning the custody and the disposition rights over fro-
14 See Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368, at *3 (comparing in vitro fertili-
zation to in vivo fertilization and ruling that the rights of the wife concerning the
disposition of the pre-zygotes were paramount to the husband's), rev'd 663 N.Y.S.
2d at 590 (deciding that the parties had expressed their mutual intentions in a
consent form prior to entering the IVF program and "that decision must be scru-
pulously honored"), affd 696 N.E. 2d 174 (ruling that the couple's written agree-
ment between the parties manifested an intention to have the pre-zygotes donated
to an IVF research program in the event of a contingency, such as divorce).
15 See Kass, 696 N.E. 2d at 180.
16 See id. at 181. Inter se is defined as "between or among themselves."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 825 (7th ed. 1999).
17 See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text.
20 See Kass, 696 N.E. 2d at 180.
21 Id.
22 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 585.
23 Id. at 585.
24 See Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174. Prior to Kass v. Kass, no jurisdiction has held a
contract dispositive of the parties' rights over frozen pre-zygotes.
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zen pre-zygotes created by the couple's gametes25 during their mar-
riage. More specifically, this Comment examines the Kass v. Kass
decision and its significance on future cases entering the judicial
system with the same or similar issues. Part I of this Comment
briefly describes the medical procedures of IVF and embryo cry-
opreservation. Part II, Sections A, B and C examine the legal sta-
tus accorded to IVF created pre-zygotes by focusing on three
dominant theories (e.g., the property view, the human life view, and
the "special respect" view) that the courts, state legislatures, and
commentators have utilized. In particular, Section C examines a
decision from Tennessee's highest court, which provided the foun-
dation for the Kass court. Part III discusses Kass and analyzes how
New York's court system confronted, and ultimately resolved, a dis-
pute between a divorced couple concerning the future of their pre-
zygotes. Part IV discusses the future impact of the Kass decision by
exploring both the positive and the negative effects of this ruling.
In addition, Part IV proposes federal legislation mandating that
IVF participants execute, prior to the start of any IVF procedure,
consent forms clearly indicating their intentions and choices in the
event of a divorce or disagreement. Finally, this Comment con-
cludes that although the Court of Appeals failed to address certain
issues, such as the legal status of pre-zygotes, the dispute was equi-
tably resolved and correctly decided.
25 A gamete is defined as "a reproductive element; one of two cells produced
by gametocyte, male (spermatozoon, or sperm) and female (ovum, or egg), whose
union is necessary, in sexual reproduction, to initiate the development of a new
individual." See MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE
1085 (5th ed. 1992). The conjugation of male and female gametes produces a zy-
gote. Id.
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I. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES -
THE MEDICAL PROCEDURES
26
A. In Vitro Fertilization2 7
In Vitro Fertilization ("IVF") is a medical procedure, which
takes approximately two weeks to complete 28 and affords infertile2 9
couples an opportunity to conceive a child.30 The IVT procedure
begins with the use of hormonal medication to hyperstimulate a
woman's ovaries to produce a large number of eggs31 that can be
safely fertilized. 32 Next, the mature eggs are retrieved surgically by
either laparoscopic surgery33 or ultrasound-guided transvaginal as-
piration.34 Once the eggs have been retrieved, they are fertilized
26 Although beyond the scope of this Comment, several reproductive
techniques in the field of ART are available to help an infertile couple achieve a
pregnancy. See generally MACHELLE M. SEIBEL & SUSAN L. CROCKIN, FAMILY
BUILDING THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND
ETHICAL ISSUES 3-16 (1996) (describing additional medical procedures in the field
of ART).
27 Louise Brown, the first child conceived using the IVF process, was born in
Great Britain in July 1978. See Lance Morrow, When One Body Can Save
Another: A Family's Act Of Lifesaving Conception Was On The Side Of Angels,
But Hovering In The Wings Is The Devilish Ghost Of Dr. Mengele, TIME, June 17,
1991 at 54.
28 See Clifton Perry & L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos: Who
Shall Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 467 (1992).
29 Infertility exists "when a couple is unable to achieve a pregnancy after one
year of regular unprotected sexual intercourse." BLACK'S MED. DICTIONARY 295
(37th ed. 1992).
30 See generally Christi D. Ahnen, Comment, Disputes Over Frozen Em-
bryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do We Decide? An Analysis of Davis v.
Davis, York v. Jones, and State Statutes Affecting Reproductive Choices, 24 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 1299 (1991).
31 "Oocytes" or "ova," however, is the precise term for the female gamete
reproductive unit. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 869 (2d ed. 1985).
32 See SEIBEL & CROCKIN, supra note 26, at 3-4; see also 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS 1448-49 (1978).
33 Laparoscopy is a surgical procedure where an incision is made near the
woman's naval area, and a telescope-like instrument (laparoscope) is inserted and
used to view the ovaries. See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, supra note 32, at
1448. See also Perry & Schneider, supra note 28, at 467. A special needle is then
used to retrieve the mature eggs. Id.
34 In ultrasound-guided transvaginal aspiration, eggs are obtained from the
ovaries by inserting a needle through the vaginal wall rather than through the ab-
dominal wall. See SEIBEL & CROCKIN, supra note 26, at 4, 6. See generally ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, supra note 32, at 1448; ROBYN ROWLAND, LIVING
LABORATORIES: WOMEN AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 19, 23 (1992) (ex-
plaining that although this procedure is more comfortable for the woman, it pro-
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with the man's sperm in vitro,35 in a petri dish.36 At this time, the
physician usually fertilizes more eggs than can safely be used for
reproductive purposes, but only implants three to four of the result-
ing pre-embryos. 37 The number of pre-embryos implanted is lim-
ited because of the increased possibility of multiple pregnancies,
which poses risks to the woman's health.38 The fertilized eggs are
then incubated for one to three days before they are ready to be
implanted in the woman. 39 Shortly thereafter, the physician trans-
fers the pre-embryos back to the uterus for implantation during the
woman's menstrual cycle. 40 In about twelve weeks, the physician
can determine if the IVF procedure was successful and if the
woman is pregnant. 41 The extra pre-embryos may then be cry-
opreserved,42 discarded, donated to another infertile couple, or
duces fewer eggs than laparoscopy). See also Owen K. Davis & Zev Rosenwaks,
In Vitro Fertilization, in 2 REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY, SURGERY, AND
TECHNOLOGY 2319, 2328-29 (Eli Y. Adashi et al. eds., 1996).
35 In vitro is defined as "outside the living body and in an artificial environ-
ment." WEBSTER'S MED. DESK DICTIONARY 350 (1986).
36 See SEIBEL & CROCKIN, supra note 26, at 5; see also generally 4 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF BIOETHICS, supra note 32, at 1449.
37 See DOUGLAS J. CUSINE, NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 134
(1988).
38 See id. See also Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 34, at 2330-31 ("Beyond
three or four embryos, however, the risk of high-order multiple gestation can in-
crease sharply..."); John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Lib-
erty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 948
(1986) (noting "the chance of pregnancy is very small if only one fertilized egg is
transferred to the uterus"); Alan Trounson & Jeremy Osborn, In Vitro Fertilization
and Embryo Development, in HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 57, 80
(Alan Trounson & David K. Gardner eds., 1993) ("Under optimal conditions, the
maximum number of oocytes or embryos transferred should be restricted to two or
three..."); R. BLANK & J. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECH-
NOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 85, 91 (1995) (explaining that hyperstimula-
tion is fatal in rare cases).
3 See Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 34, at 2329-31 (explaining methods of
insemination, whereby oocytes are exposed to sperm, and the transfer of the fertil-
ized oocytes, now called pre-embryos or embryos).
40 See Perry & Schneider, supra note 28, at 468.
41 Although very successful, the IVF procedure does not provide a 100%
guarantee of pregnancy. See id. But see David Levran et al., Pregnancy Potential
of Human Oocytes - The Effect of Cryopreservation, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1153
(1990) (stating that even with the advancement of the IVF procedure, the highest
success rate for pregnancy is no more than 25 percent).
42 See infra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
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used for research, depending on the couple's desires and the spe-
cific clinic's procedures. 43
B. Cryopreservation
Embryo cryopreservation has become a standard practice at
IVF programs because it enhances both the safety and the effi-
ciency of the IVF procedure. 44 During the cryopreservation pro-
cess, the additional IVF pre-embryos are frozen in liquid nitrogen
at a temperature of negative 195 degrees centigrade. 45 "At this
temperature, the [pre-embryos] can safely be preserved in a sus-
pended biological state. '46 After freezing, the pre-embryos are
carefully stored in special containers and may eventually be thawed
for implantation in the IVF patient.47 Cryopreservation is advanta-
geous because the process enables a physician to postpone embryo
implantation until the negative effect(s) of the hormone drug treat-
ment has passed.48 In addition, cryopreservation is beneficial to the
43 See generally JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM
AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 104-7 (1994). See also Helen Be-
quaert Holmes, To Freeze or Not to Freeze: Is That An Option? (outlining options
for handling of extra embryos), in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 193,
196 (Helen Bequaert Holmes ed., 1994).
44 See generally Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, Special Report Frozen Em-
bryos: Policy Issues, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1584, 1584-85 (1985) (stating that with
the cryopreservation process there is no need for repeated IVF surgical proce-
dures); Wood, The Current Status and Future of Assisted Reproductive Technology
in the Female, in IMPLANTATION IN MAMMALS 277, 283 (L. Gianaroli, A. Cam-
pana, & A.O. Trounson eds., 1993). Cryopreservation is used to reduce the
amount of invasive procedures needed to retrieve reproductive material or to pre-
serve healthy reproductive material for a donor who is at risk of losing their repro-
ductive ability. Id. See also Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998)
(explaining that cryopreservation "serves to reduce both medical and physical
costs because eggs do not have to be retrieved with each attempted implantation,
and delay may actually improve the chances of pregnancy"). But see Alan Troun-
son & Karen Dawson, Storage and Disposal of Embryos and Gametes: Patients
Must Be Aware of Their Rights and Responsibilities, BRIT. MED. J., July 6, 1996, at
1. Currently, embryos are frozen because "human [non-fertilized] eggs cannot yet
be frozen" effectively. Id.
45 See Perry & Schneider, supra note 28, at 468.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 See Larry Thompson, Fertility with Less Fuss, TIME, Nov. 14, 1994, at 79.
The IVF process can be stressful where the hormone injections can "produce pain,
bloating and sharp mood swings." Id. See also Perry & Schneider, supra note 28,
at 468. Ovarian-stimulating hormones temporarily reduce the ability of the uterine
lining to accept the fertilized embryo, thus not causing a pregnancy. As such, cry-
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female patient by eliminating the need for repeated hormonal treat-
ment and the discomfort and pain involved in extracting eggs each
time IVF is attempted.4 9 Furthermore, cryopreservation "reduces
the risk of multiple [pregnancies]. 5° Finally, the cryopreservation
of pre-embryos for future use is far less expensive 5' and time-con-
suming52 than repeating IVF each time the procedure fails. 53 Nev-
ertheless, despite the advantages to cryopreservation, difficult legal
questions arise when a couple disagrees about the disposition of
their remaining frozen pre-embryos.5 4 These legal conflicts arise
because, during the time lapse between fertilization and implanta-
opreservation allows a physician to implant the fertilized eggs in the woman's
uterus during a later, normal menstrual cycle, and therefore increasing the
woman's chances of becoming pregnant. Id.
49 See Daniel I. Steinberg, Note, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational Rights
and Disputes Over the Fate of Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 317
(1997) (describing the painful injections and aspiration procedures associated with
IVF).
50 See Jennifer L. Carow, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an
Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreation Freedom and Reproductive Technol-
ogy, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 523, 529 (1994).
51 See Robertson, supra note 38, at 949 (explaining that the ability to cry-
opreserve pre-embryos reduces the cost of overall IVF procedures for most
couples). See also Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Comment, To Have or Not to
Have: Whose Procreative Rights Prevail in Disputes Over Dispositions of Frozen
Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1381 n.36 (citing Judy Licht, Frozen in Time:
Storing of Embryos Boosts the Chances of Pregnancy - And Raises Ethical Ques-
tions, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at Z10) (noting that the cost of extraction and
implantation of a single fertilized egg is $10,000.00 and the cost of transferring
thawed embryos is about $2,000).
52 See Perry & Schneider, supra note 28, at 467-68. Each time a patient
begins a new IVF cycle, she must endure two weeks of daily drug injections. Id.
Embryo cryopreservation eliminates this two-week period and allows the patient
to attempt implantation more frequently. Id.
53 See E.P. VOLPE, TEST-TUBE CONCEPTION: A BLEND OF LOVE AND SCI-
ENCE 59 (1987). See also Jennifer P. Brown, Comment, "Unwanted, Anonymous,
Biological Descendants": Mandatory Donation Laws and Laws Prohibiting Preem-
bryo Discard Violate the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 183,
188-89 (1.993) (stating that "[c]ryopreservation both improves the chances of
achieving pregnancy and reduces the emotional, physical and monetary costs of
subsequent cycles of treatment.").
54 The ability to freeze human non-fertilized eggs effectively could resolve
disputes between divorcing couples concerning frozen embryo disposition. See
Marilyn Moysa, Public Input Sought on Frozen Embryo Dilemma: Officials Want
to Know How Long to Keep Embryos in Storage, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 2,1996,
A4. "That way, human eggs and sperm could be frozen separately for future use
and there would be no question of their status as a human being." Id. See also
infra notes 99-1.23, 124-212 and accompanying text.
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tion, which is facilitated by the freezing of the pre-embryos, spouses
may change their individual positions about both implantation and
their marital relationship. 55 Consequently, the courts are forced to
decide the legal status of the frozen pre-embryos. 56
II. THE CATEGORIZATION OF THE NATURE OF
THE PRE-ZYGOTE
Before deciding which spouse of a divorcing couple should re-
ceive custody of their frozen pre-embryos, a court must first deter-
mine how the pre-embryos are analyzed from a legal viewpoint. 57
Although the legal status of frozen pre-embryos is an unsettled area
of debate, 58 disputes in this subject area generally depend on (1)
how the courts legally classify pre-embryos, 59 and (2) whether the
parties executed a prior agreement that addressed disposition rights
over the pre-embryos. 60 Currently, three possible models exist con-
cerning the nature of frozen pre-embryos. The first model accepts
the view that pre-embryos are the property of the gamete donors,
suggesting that ownership and dispositional authority should attach
to their progenitors. 61 The second model proposes that the pre-em-
bryo is a human being and should be given the full legal status af-
55 See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 589 (a wife, who initially sought custody of fro-
zen pre-embryos for self-implantation, changed her position and later requested
that the pre-embryos be donated to an infertile couple); A.Z., 725 N.E. 2d at 1059
(the court voids an IVF agreement between a couple because the circumstances
leading to the couple's dispute were unanticipated when they entered into the
agreement). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. 742.17 (West 1995). The Florida statute
provides that the couple and the IVF clinic must enter into a written agreement
that provides for the disposition of the couple's embryos in the event of a divorce
or any other unforeseen circumstances. Id.
56 See infra notes 57-123 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 58-123 and accompanying text.
58 See Perry & Schneider, supra note 28, at 477-88.
59 See Bill E. Davidoff, Comment, Frozen Embryos: A Need For Thawing in
the Legislative Process, 47 SMU L. REV. 131, 132 (1993) (stating that the legal
status of frozen embryos is at the heart of embryo disposition disputes). See also
CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN: CHOOSING HUMAN FUTURES
58, 63-64 (1998) (considering the implications of determining the status of frozen
embryos).
60 See infra notes 138-212 and accompanying text.
61 See generally James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the
Issues Raised Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 813 (1998) (advocating that "gametes, zygotes, preembryos
and embryos are inescapably property"); Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Prog-
eny, Body Part. Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS
20001 775
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forded to all persons.62 Finally, the third model suggests that pre-
embryos are neither persons nor property, but rather "an interim
category that is entitled to special respect because of their potential
for human life."'63
A. The Property View - York v. Jones
The concept of "property" in the law is extremely broad and
abstract. The term "property" has generally been used to "denote
everything which is [or can be] the subject of ownership, corporeal
or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or
personal; [it includes] everything that has an exchangeable value or
which goes to make up wealth."' 64 Notwithstanding, the definition
of "property" has more commonly been referred to as the legal
"bundle of rights" that a person possesses in a thing or an interest,
rather than the tangible thing or interest itself.65 Although not cre-
ated by the Constitution,66 property interests "are created and their
dimensions defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law."'67 According to phi-
losopher John Locke, people "enter[ ] the world owning only [their]
body and its capacity to labor."'68 Then, only by mixing "labor with
unowned resources," a person will acquire property rights "in
things external to" the human body.69 Accordingly, property law
L. REV. 193, 200-14 (1997) (focusing on the personal property dichotomy and its
effect on a "frozen embryo's legal status").
62 See Robertson, supra note 38, at 971. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:126 (West 1991) (stating that an in vitro fertilized human embryo is a "biologi-
cal human being").
63 See Robertson, supra note 38, at 972. See also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d
588, 596-97 (Tenn. 1992) (explaining that gamete providers do not have a "true
property interest" in the pre-embryo, but "have an interest in the nature of owner-
ship, to the extent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition
of the preembryos").
64 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (6th ed. 1990).
65 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1.982) The "bundle of rights" which have been associated with property include
the rights to possess, to use, to exclude, to profit, and to transfer to others. Id.
66 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
67 See id. (discussing the source of legitimate claims to a protectable property
interest).
68 See Susan E. Looper-Friedman, "Keep Your Laws Off My Body": Abor-
tion Regulations and the Takings Clause, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. 253, 273 n.103
(1.995) (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 5, § 27 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1980)).
69 See id. at 273 n.104.
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provides a potential analytical framework for cases involving ge-
netic material by focusing on the rights and interests of ownership
and control in the progenitors. 70
The first dispute over frozen embryos did not arise in a divorce
case. In York v. Jones,7' a married couple underwent IVF treat-
ment at the Jones Institute in Virginia. 72 At the start of the IVF
procedure, the Yorks signed a "Cryopreservation Agreement" 7
3
with the Institute that detailed their rights to the extra embryos.
74
After failing to achieve a pregnancy on four separate occasions,75
the Yorks eventually moved to California and sought to have their
last remaining cryopreserved embryo transferred to another clinic
in California. 76 The Institute, however, refused to transfer the fro-
zen embryo, claiming that transfer of the embryo purportedly fell
outside the "Cryopreservation Agreement. ' 77 The court held that
the "Cryopreservation Agreement" created a bailment relation-
70 See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 426-27 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that
the male and female gamete providers retain property rights in the pre-zygote cre-
ated by their gametes). But see American Fertilization Soc'y, Ethical Statement on
In Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILITY & STERILITY (no. 1) 12,.12 (1984) (stating that
the property interest did not signify traditional property ownership, but that indi-
viduals are the appropriate decision-making authority concerning the disposition
of their gametes).
71 See York, 717 F. Supp. at 422 (noting that this was a case of first
impression).
72 Id. at 423.
73 See id. at 424. "The Cryopreservation Agreement explained that ... cry-
opreservation ... is available in the event more than five pre-zygotes are retrieved
during the IVF treatment." Id. "The agreement further stated that . . . cry-
opreservation . . . [can] reduce the risk of multiple births, while simultaneously
'creating additional opportunities for the initiation of pregnancy with the transfer
of concepti developed from frozen-thawed pre-zygotes.'" Id.
74 See id. at 424. The agreement stated that the Yorks could withdraw con-
sent or discontinue participation at any time. Id. The agreement also stated that
the Yorks would have dispositional authority over the embryos. Id. The agree-
ment further provided that, in the event of a divorce, the legal ownership of the
embryos would be determined by a property settlement. Id. Finally, the agree-
ment stated that the embryo would be stored only as long as the Yorks were pa-
tients at the Institute, and that if the Yorks no longer wished implantation, they
could anonymously donate the embryo to an infertile couple, donate the embryo
for research, or have it destroyed. Id.
75 See id. at 423-24.
76 See York, 717 F. Supp. at 425.
77 See id. The clinic argued that the Jones' right to the embryos were limited
to the three categories expressly provided for in the agreement and did not include
inter-institutional transfer of the embryos. Id.
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ship,78 and that the Institute-bailee had an obligation to return the
frozen embryo because it was the property of the Yorks.79 In its
holding, the court accorded the embryo property status solely be-
cause the "Cryopreservation Agreement" categorized the frozen
embryo as property.80 The couple's "possessory interest[s]" in the
embryo, and not the rights of the embryo itself, controlled the deci-
sion in this case.81 More importantly, the York "property model"
ruling provides a concrete foundation for disputes concerning own-
ership interests between the IVF couple and a third party. 2 York
established that dispositional authority over frozen embryos pre-
sumptively lies with the prospective parents, unless clearly stated
otherwise in an IVF consent form.83 However, the "property
model" ruling fails to provide adequate legal guidance as to which
of the prospective parents obtain disposition rights in the event the
IVF couple does not agree. 84
B. The Human Life View - Louisiana and other
State Legislation
Advocates of the "human life view" consider pre-embryos a
human being entitled to all the rights attributed to a person.85 Pro-
78 Id. Although the parties expressed no intent to create a bailment, under
Virginia law, all that is needed "is the element of lawful possession however cre-
ated, and duty to account for the thing as the property of another that creates the
bailment." Id.
79 In fact, the court did not even discuss any possibilities other than that the
embryo was the property of one of the parties. See id. at 425-27. The case eventu-
ally settled, leaving the strength of the embryo-as-property view questionable. Id.
But see Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp. of N.Y., No. 74 Civ. 3855, slip op. at 7-8, 11,
16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978), available in 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 (rejecting
the embryo-as-property view on a conversion of personal property claim brought
by a couple against a physician who intentionally destroyed the couple's frozen
embryo because he believed the IVF procedure was too premature to attempt with
humans).
80 See York, 717 F. Supp. at 424-25. See also Weldon E. Havins & James J.
Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap Between the Science of Artificial Reproductive
Technology and the Laws Which Govern That Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
825, 837 n.1Ol (1999) (stating that "embryos are the 'property' of the gamete prov-
iders") (citing American Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Statement on In Vitro Fertilization,
41 FERTILITY & STERILITY (no. 1) 12 (1984)).
81 See York, 717 F. Supp. at 425-27.
82 See Dehmel, supra note 51, at 1384-85.
83 See York, 717 F. Supp. at 425-27.
84 See Dehmel, supra note 51, at 1384-85.
85 See Ahnen, supra note 30, 1308-09.
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ponents of this view believe that there is a duty to protect IVF cre-
ated pre-embryos from harm by immediately transferring them to a
uterus. 86 These proponents condemn the use of embryo cry-
opreservation because of potential harm to pre-embryos. 87 How-
ever, despite the arguments of the advocates, under federal law and
all state statutory law, Louisiana is the only jurisdiction to pass leg-
islation attempting to regulate the legal rights and statuses afforded
to IVF created pre-embryos. 88 In Louisiana, pre-embryos "have
been given rights and limits have been imposed on how [they] may
be treated." 89 Louisiana law declares that pre-embryos are "per-
sons" entitled to all the usual protections of any "juridical person" 90
and should "not be intentionally destroyed." 91 Louisiana also af-
fords pre-embryos the right to sue or be sued. 92 The statute, how-
ever, provides that "in vitro fertilized human ovum that fail[ ] to
develop further over a thirty-six hour period except when the em-
bryo is in a state of cryopreservation, [are] considered nonviable
and ... not considered a juridical person. '93 More specifically, the
statute states that the fertilized human ovum is deemed to be a bio-
logical human being, which is not the property of the fertilization
physician, the facility that employs the physician, or the donors of
86 See id.
87 See id. at 1308. Proponents of the "human life view" assert that "in vitro
embryos must be transferred to a uterus, and condemn[ ] any intervention before
transfer that might harm the embryo or is not therapeutic, such as freezing and
embryo research." Id. at 1309.
88 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-130 (West 1991) (setting forth details
of ownership, destruction, and legal status of fertilized eggs produced by IV). See
also Elisa Kristine Poole, Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to Frozen Em-
bryos, 4 AM. J. FAM. L. 67, 85 (1990). According to Poole, the Louisiana statute
may be unconstitutional under federal law "because it infringes on individual's
right of procreative choice at a stage where the state has no compelling interest in
the embryo." Id.
89 See Poole, supra note 88, at 84-85.
90 "Juridical" is defined as "of or relating to judicial proceedings or to the
administration of [the law]." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 854 (7th ed. 1999).
9t See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129. But see id. § 14:2 (West 1998). How-
ever, the Louisiana Criminal Code does not protect a "person" as a "human be-
ing" until after the "moment of fertilization and implantation." Id.
92 See id. § 9:132 (West 1999). An "action may be brought on behalf of the
in vitro fertilized human ovum as a juridical person." Id. Basically, "a court in the
parish where the in vitro fertilized ovum is located may appoint a curator, upon
motion of the in vitro fertilization patients, their heirs, or physicians who caused in
vitro fertilization to be performed, to protect the in vitro fertilized human ovum's
rights." Id. § 9:126.
93 See id. § 9:129.
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the sperm and ovum. 94 If the gamete providers renounce their pa-
rental rights for in utero implantation, the embryo thereby become
available for adoption.95 The physician then becomes the tempo-
rary guardian of the embryo,96 and is responsible to safeguard the
embryo until relieved when the court appoints a "curator" to guard
the interests of the embryo.97 Finally, although no other state has
explicitly defined pre-embryos as persons, 98 Illinois has criminal-
ized the acts that result in pre-embryo destruction.99
C. The "Special Respect" View and the Davis v. Davis Decision
The Davis'00 case, decided by the Supreme Court of Tennes-
see, is the first American judicial decision to deal with custody "dis-
putes between a divorcing couple regarding the disposition of
jointly-created frozen pre-embryos."' 01 Also, Davis is the first case
to attempt to synthesize the property, human life, and special re-
spect views accorded to pre-embryos.' 02 In Davis, Junior and Mary
Sue Davis sought IVF treatment, but failed to achieve a pregnancy
94 See id. § 9:126 (stating that pre-embryos "cannot be owned by the in vitro
fertilization patients who owe it a high duty of care and prudent administration").
But see J.B. v. M.B., 04-95-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 28, 1998) (ruling that
cryopreserved embryos are not living entities); Marcia Chambers, Legal Issues
Seen in Vatican Call for Laws to Bar Birth Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1987,
at Al, B5 ((classifying a pre-embryo as a human being will likely "deter physicians
from offering even basic in vitro fertilization" because of the strict duty that it
imposes on the treating physicians) (quoting Professor Lori B. Andrews))).
95 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130. Fertilization patients can only renounce
their parental duties by a notarized act, and only when they renounce their paren-
tal rights will the pre-embryo be available for "adoptive implantation." Id.
96 See id. § 9:126.
97 See id.
98 In New York, frozen, stored pre-embryos are not considered "persons" for
constitutional purposes. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 (2000).
99 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1.2 (3) (b) (West 1993)
(criminalizing the killing of an unborn child, defined as "any individual of the
human species from fertilization until birth"); 18 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(c)
(1989) (prohibiting any fetal experimentation on an unborn or live child). See also
MICH. CoMP. UAWS § 722.859 (1993) (criminalizing commercial surrogacy agree-
ments). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (1992) (permitting the "disposition of
the product of [IVF] prior to implantation" without state interference).
100 Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sep. 13, 1990), affd 842
S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nor., 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
101 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998) (citing Davis, 842 S.W. 2d
at 604).
102 See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588.
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after two implantation attempts. 10 3 Junior and Mary Sue then de-
cided to cryopreserve the remaining seven pre-embryos. 10 4 The
couple, however, did not execute any written agreement specifying
the disposition of the pre-embryos in the event of their deaths or
divorce.' 05 Subsequently, Junior and Mary Sue decided to di-
vorce.106 The couple agreed on all terms of the marriage dissolu-
tion except for the disposition of the pre-embryos. 10 7 Initially,
Mary Sue sought custody of the pre-embryos for future self-implan-
tation, while Junior preferred that the pre-embryos continue to be
stored at the IVF clinic. 10 8 Junior argued that implantation would
force him to become a parent against his will and outside the
bounds of marriage. 10 9 By the time the case reached the Tennessee
Supreme Court, both Junior and Mary Sue changed their posi-
tions.110 Mary Sue wanted to donate the frozen pre-embryos to an
infertile and childless couple.11' Junior, however, now wanted the
pre-embryos destroyed. 112
1. The "Special Respect" View
The trial court awarded Mary Sue custody of the remaining
frozen pre-embryos, 113 ruling that the pre-embryos were not prop-
erty, but "human beings existing as embryos."' 14 Thus, the pre-em-
bryos should be treated as children, whose best interests required
"that they be available for implantation."' 15 On appeal, the Ten-
nessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, implied that the
pre-embryos were, in their nature, property, and awarded both Jun-
ior and Mary Sue joint decision-making dispositional authority over
the frozen pre-embryos."1 6 The Court of Appeals reasoned that
103 See id. at 592.
104 See id. at 590.
105 See id.
106 See id. at 592.
107 See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 589.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See id.
"l See id. at 590.
112 See id.
113 Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sep. 13, 1990), affd 842
S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
114 See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 594. At trial, the judge heard and adopted the
testimony that "human life begins at the moment of conception." Id.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 589.
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Junior had a constitutional right not to beget children absent a
pregnancy. 17 The court concluded by stating "there is no compel-
ling state interest to justify our ordering implantation against the
will of either party."'"I8 Finally, the court rejected the trial court's
finding that life begins at conception. 19
Although the Supreme Court of Tennessee did not oppose the
Court of Appeals ruling, it nonetheless granted Mary Sue review. 120
The Court began its analysis by attempting to determine the frozen
pre-embryos' legal status. 12 1 The court held that pre-embryos are
117 See Davis, 1990 WL 130807 at *2.
118 See id. at *2-*3 (holding that it was not state policy to force parenthood
upon any individual).
"9 See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 594 (stating that "the Court of Appeals explicitly
rejected the trial judge's reasoning, as well as the result" and that "the argument
that "human life begins at the moment of conception" had been abandoned by the
appellant, despite her success with it in the trial court" (footnote omitted)).
120 See id. at 590. The court "granted review, not because [it] disagree[d] with
the basic legal analysis by the intermediate court, but because of the importance of
the case in terms of the development of law regarding the new reproductive tech-
nologies, and because the decision of the Court of Appeals does not give adequate
guidance to the trial court in the event the parties cannot agree." Id.
121 See id. at 594 (stating that "[o]ne of the fundamental issues the inquiry
poses is whether the pre-embryos . . . should be considered 'persons' or 'prop-
erty"'). See id. at 596 (citing the Report of the Ethics Committee of The American
Fertility Society). The court looked to the American Fertility Society's Committee
Report, which outlined three views on the legal status of embryos. Id. The report
stated:
Three major ethical positions have been articulated in the debate
over preembryo status. At one extreme is the view of the preem-
bryo as a human subject after fertilization, which requires that it be
accorded the rights of a person. This position entails an obligation
to provide an opportunity for implantation to occur and tends to
ban any action before transfer that might harm the preembryo or
that is not immediately therapeutic, such as freezing and some
preembryo research.
At the opposite extreme is the view that the preembryo has a status
no different from any other human tissue. With the consent of
those who have decision-making authority over the preembryo, no
limit should be imposed on actions taken with preembryos.
A third view - one that is most widely held - takes an intermedi-
ate position between the other two. It holds that the preembryo
deserves respect greater than that accorded to human tissues but
not the respect accorded [to] actual persons. The preembryo is due
greater respect than other human tissue because of its potential to
become a person and because of its symbolic meaning for many
people. Yet, it should not be treated as a person, because it has not
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neither legal persons nor a form of property. 122 Instead, the court
decided that pre-embryos occupy a special category that entitled
them to "special respect because of their potential for human
life."'1 23 The court reasoned that gamete providers do not have a
"true property interest" in their pre-embryos, but rather "an inter-
est in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have deci-
sion-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos,
within the scope of policy set by law." 124
2. The Dispositional Authority - The Tennessee Supreme
Court Decides How Custody Over Frozen Pre-embryos
Should Be Determined
Having determined that the pre-embryos occupied this "spe-
cial respect" category, the Tennessee Supreme Court next ad-
dressed the issue of whether IVF consent agreements are
binding.1 25 The court decided this issue by concluding that prior
agreements between a divorcing couple concerning the disposition
of frozen pre-embryos should be presumed valid and enforcea-
ble. 126 However, since there was no prior agreement between Jun-
ior and Mary Sue, the court still had to decide which of the two
gamete providers would prevail in this dispute. The court turned to
the right of procreational autonomy. 127 Thus, relying on the abor-
tion and contraception decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, the Tennesse Supreme Court first stated that the "right of
procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal signifi-
cance - the right to procreate and the right to avoid procrea-
yet developed the features of personhood, is not yet established as
developmentally individual, and may never realize its biological po-
tential. Id.
122 See id. at 597.
123 See id. at 596-97 (adopting the American Fertility Society's third view that
embryos are an entity deserving "special respect"). "Special respect" means that
the embryo deserves more respect than human tissue, but not as much respect as a
human person does. Id. at 596. See also A.Z. v. B.Z., No 1.5-008-96 (Mass. Fain. &
Prob. Ct. Mar. 25, 1996) (according frozen pre-embryos an intermediate "special
status" between that of human life and that of property).
124 See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 597 (noting that the American Fertility Society
suggests that "it is reasonable to assume that the gamete providers have primary
decision-making authority regarding preembryos in the absence of specific legisla-
tion on the subject.").
125 See id. at 598.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 602-04.
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tion. ' 128 Next, the court asserted that both the mother and the
father should be viewed as "entirely equivalent gamete-provid-
ers," 129 with the mother's interest in procreation weighed against
the father's interest in avoiding procreation. 130 Eventually, the
court gave preference to Junior, concluding that Junior's interest to
avoid procreation outweighed Mary Sue's right to procreate by do-
nating the frozen pre-embryos to another couple.' 3' The court rea-
soned that Junior should not be compelled to become a father
against his will because such action would inflict a greater burden
than denying Mary Sue the opportunity to use the pre-embryos to
procreate. 132 Hence, the court concluded, the party wishing to
avoid procreation would ordinarily prevail. 133 However, in dicta,
the Court noted that if "Mary Sue ... was seeking to use the em-
bryos herself, the decision would have been closer; 134 but, only if
she could not achieve pregnancy by any other reasonable
means."'135 In justifying the decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court
128 See id. at 601.
129 See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 601.
130 See id. at 604.
131 See id.; see also J.B., 751 A. 2d 613 (holding that a wife's request to de-
stroy the couples frozen embryos (the right to avoid procreation) outweighed the
husband's wishes to preserve them for future use (the right to procreate)).
132 See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 597. The court balanced Junior's expected fi-
nancial and unique psychological burdens if forced to become an unwilling parent
against Mary Sue's desire to donate the eggs to another couple. The court looked
to Junior's testimony that he had severe problems caused by separation from his
parents when he was younger. Id. at 603-04. The court then noted that "refusal to
permit donation ... would impose on [Mary Sue] the burden of knowing that the
lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were futile, and that the preembryos to
which she contributed genetic material would never become children," id. at 604,
whereas donation would impose on the father "a lifetime of either wondering
about his parental status or knowing about his parental status but having no con-
trol over it . . . . Donation, if a child came of it, would rob him twice - his
procreational autonomy would be defeated and his relationship with his offspring
would be prohibited." Id.
133 See id. at 604. See also Dehmel, supra note 51, at 1402 (arguing that the
right of the party not to procreate outweighs the right of the party seeking to
reproduce because of the irreversibility of procreation and the psychological bur-
den it places on an unwilling parent).
134 See Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm is Cheap, Eggs Are
Not, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1079 (1996) (concluding that "we should generally
decide . . . cases [concerning the disposition of embryos] in favor of the woman
when she desires to use the frozen embryos to further her [own] reproductive
capacity").
135 See Davis at 604. However, the Davis court failed to define what a "rea-
sonable means" of achieving parenthood means.
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pointed to alternatives available to the woman, such as adoption
and IVF cycles with a new partner.136 Finally, the Tennessee Court
set forth a five-step formula to follow when deciding disputes in-
volving pre-embryo disposition consistent with their holding.137
III. THE KASS CASE 1 3 8
A. Factual Setting
Maureen and Steven Kass were married in July of 1988.139 As
a result of Maureen's in utero 140 exposure to Diethylstilbestrol
(DES),141 the couple was unable to conceive a child through coital
reproduction.142 Accordingly, Maureen and Steven enrolled in the
IVF program at John T. Mather Memorial Hospital in Long Island,
New York.143 At that time, the IVF clinic required, and the couple
executed, a "General IVF Consent Form No.1.' 144 Initially, Mau-
reen and Steven unsuccessfully tried, on ten separate occasions, to
achieve an IVF pregnancy. 145 Next, Maureen and Steve opted for a
new cryogenic IVF procedure, 146 which required, and the couple
136 See id. at 604.
137 See id. First, a court should look to the preference of the progenitors. "If
their wishes cannot be ascertained or if there is a dispute, then their prior agree-
ment concerning disposition should be carried out." Id. If no prior agreement
exists between the progenitors as to disposition of the pre-embryos, the relative
interests of parties in using or not using the embryos must be weighed, with the
party wishing to avoid procreation usually prevailing. If the parties wishing to use
the embryos have no reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means
other than use of the embryos, then the argument in favor of using the embryos
should prevail. If the party seeking custody of the embryos intends to donate them
to another couple, the objecting party "obviously has the greater interest and
should prevail." Id.
138 For an excellent and delightful poetic synopsis of Kass v. Kass, see Robert
E. Rains, A Scramble For The Eggs, Kass v. Kass, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 173 (1998).
139 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 583.
140 In utero is defined as "within the uterus." See WEBSTER'S, supra note 35,
at 349.
141 DES is a synthetic nonsteroidal estrogen having estrogenic activity similar
to but greater than that of estrogen. TABER CYCLOPEDIC MED. DICTIONARY
544-5 (17th ed. 1993). Women who have been exposed in utero to DES are sub-
ject to an increased risk of vaginal or cervical cancer. Id.
142 Coital reproduction is defined as vaginal intercourse between a male and a
female. See id. at 411-12.
143 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 583.
144 See id. Form No. 1 gave the IVF clinic permission to retrieve as many
eggs as medically possible. Id.
145 See id.
146 See id.
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also executed, an informed consent form for the "cryopreservation
of pre-zygotes" ("Form 2"). 147 Finally, Maureen and Steve also ex-
ecuted an addendum to the informed consent form for the "disposi-
tion of the cryopreserved pre-zygotes" ("Form 2.1").148 Generally,
the Forms authorized the retrieval of Maureen's eggs and indicated
the couple's agreement to cryopreserve any extra pre-embryos. 14 9
More specifically, Form 2 provided that the pre-zygotes would be
stored for up to five years and would not be released without the
written consent of both Maureen and Steven.150 Form 2 also pro-
vided that if the couple divorced, the frozen pre-zygotes would be
considered property, to be awarded in a property settlement, with
any release to be directed by a court. 151 In addition, Form 2 pro-
vided that Maureen and Steven would determine the disposition of
the frozen pre-zygotes should the couple no longer wish to initiate a
pregnancy.152 Finally, Form 2.1 provided that if the couple no
longer wanted or could not decide the fate of the pre-zygotes, then
the pre-zygotes would be released to the IVF program for research
purposes. 53
Subsequently, the couple attempted to establish a surrogate
pregnancy 54 with the help of Maureen's sister; however, this proce-
147 See id.
148 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 583.
149 See id. at 583-84.
150 See id.
151 See id. at 584.
152 See id. Form 2 concluded by requiring Maureen and Steven to execute
Form 2.1 in the event of the couple's "death or any other unforeseen circumstances
... [resulting] in neither [spouse] being able to determine the disposition of... the
frozen pre-zygotes." Id.
153 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 584. Specifically, the consent form provided, in
part:
In the event that we ... are unable to make a decision regarding
the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate
our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF
program to [choose one]: ....
(b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF program
for biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF program for
approved research investigation as determined by the IVF pro-
gram." Id. (quoting the IVF Program's consent form).
154 A surrogate pregnancy is accomplished when "[a] woman agrees to be
artificially inseminated with the semen of another woman's husband; she conceives
a child, carr[ies] it to term, and after its birth surrenders it to the natural father and
his wife." See In re Baby M, 537 A. 2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
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dure also failed. 155 Shortly thereafter, Maureen and Steven decided
to divorce. 156 The couple ultimately prepared and executed a docu-
ment for an "uncontested divorce,"15 7 which set forth their under-
standing that the terms of the IVF consent forms would control the
disposition of the remaining frozen pre-zygotes. 158 Notwithstand-
ing the divorce agreement, Maureen changed her mind, opposed
the destruction or release of the pre-zygotes, and sought to recover
the remaining pre-zygotes for future self-implantation. 159 Maureen
believed that the pre-zygotes represented her last opportunity for
genetic motherhood.160 Steven, on the other hand, sought an order
directing that the pre-zygotes be released to the IVF program for
use in embryo research. 161 Steven did not want to become a parent
outside the bounds of marriage. 162
B. The Trial Court Decision
The New York Supreme Court endorsed the view of the Davis
court that the embryos were something more than property but less
than persons. 163 The court also approved of the Davis court's rec-
ognition of a right to procreate and a right to avoid procreation,1 64
but viewed the issue in a different way: "[w]hether there is a con-
ceptual or propositional difference between the product of an in
155 See Kass, N.Y.S. 2d at 584. The pre-zygotes were implanted into Mau-
reen's sister, but did not result in a pregnancy. Id. Maureen's sister then decided
against any other future implantation in her own uterus. Id.
156 See id.
157 See id. Maureen typed, and the parties executed, this "uncontested di-
vorce" agreement. Id.
158 See id. (quoting the couple's divorce decree). The "uncontested divorce"
agreement provided that:
[t]he disposition of the frozen 5 pre-zygotes at Mather Hospital is
that they should be disposed of [in] the manner outlined in our
consent form and that neither Maureen-Kass[,] Steven Kass or any-
one else will lay claim to custody of these pre-zygotes." Id. The
divorce decree, however, was never submitted to the court for final
disposition.
Id. at 585.
159 See id. at 584-85. Maureen notified the Mather Hospital that she wanted
possession of the frozen pore-zygotes. Id.
160 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 593.
161 See id. at 585.
162 See id.
163 See Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368, at *2-*3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)
(unpublished opinion), rev'd 663 N.Y.S. 2d 581 (2d Dep't 1997) (plurality opinion),
and aff'd 696 N.E. 2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (unanimous decision).
164 See Kass, 1995 WL 110368 at *3.
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Vivo 1 6 5 fertilization and the product of an in vitro fertilization?"' 166
The court found no difference between the product of an in vivo
fertilization and the product of an in vitro fertilization, 67 indicating
that it did not matter whether the union of the ovum and the sperm
"took place in the private darkness of a fallopian tube or the public
glare of a petri dish.' 168 The court explained that the husband's
rights and control over the procreative process ended with ejacula-
tion; 69 and, further reasoned that because the woman physically
bears the child and is more directly affected by the pregnancy, the
balance of their competing interests weighs in her favor.' 70 In con-
cluding, the court held that there is no constitutional right to avoid
procreation and a woman has the exclusive right to determine the
fate of the embryos. 17 1 Therefore, the court granted Maureen cus-
tody of the pre-embryos, with the condition that she implant them
within a medically reasonable time. 172 Moreover, the court stated
that Maureen had not waived her right in the consent forms or in
the "uncontested divorce" agreement. 73 Finally, the court also
concluded that the agreements the couple executed could not have
165 In vivo is defined as "in the living body or organism. A test performed on
a living organism." See TABER CYCLOPEDIC MED. DIcrIONARY, supra note 141,
at 870. The process of in vivo fertilization entails fertilization that takes place in a
woman's body. Id.
166 See Kass, 1995 WL 110368 at *2.
167 Id. at *2,
168 Id. at *4. In its decision, the trial court relied on Roe v. Wade, 420 U.S.
114 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
169 The trial court explained that "there is no legal, ethical, or logical reason
why... [IVF] should give rise to additional rights on the part of the husband." See
Kass, 1995 WL 110368 at *2. Furthermore, the court refuted the constitutional
analysis in Davis by concluding that the male's "right to avoid procreation" termi-
nated after the initial fertilization of the egg. Id. at *3. Prior case law, the court
reasoned, provides that the husband "cannot force conception" or "compel or pre-
vent an abortion." Id. As such, thZ husband also cannot prevent the implantation
of an embryo. Id.
170 See id. at *3 (noting that for "in vitro fertilizations the right of the wife
must be considered paramount and her wishes with respect to disposition must
prevail").
171 See Kass, 1995 WL 110368 at *4.
172 Id. at *5. The trial court, however, did not consider Steven's future obliga-
tion to support or his possible claims against Maureen, if any, if he is forced to
contribute. "Such matters[, the trial court concluded,] are more properly consid-
ered, if and when, a pregnancy results." Id.
173 Id. at *4 (finding that the informed consent document controlled disposi-
tion only to the extent that in the event of divorce, "distribution would be subject
to the directives of the divorce court").
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foreseen "a divorce situation," and thus, were inapplicable to this
dispute. 174
C. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second
Department Decision
On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court, but
split as to the proper resolution of the case.' 75 All five Justices
agreed that the trial court had erred in equating an in vitro fertiliza-
tion with an in vivo conception. 176 Moreover, all the Justices con-
cluded that a woman's right to bodily integrity "is not implicated in
the IVF scenario until such time as implantation actually occurs. 177
Finally, the five Justices also ruled that, when parties enter into a
joint agreement with an IVF clinic and therein determine the dispo-
sition of additional frozen pre-zygotes, that agreement is enforcea-
ble and should govern their behavior.178 The Justices, however,
174 See id. at *10.
175 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d 581 (2d Dep't 1997), affd, 696 N.E. 2d 174 (N.Y.
1998).
176 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 585. The Appellate Division stated that the
trial court "committed a fundamental error.., in equating a prospective mother's
decision whether to undergo [in vitro procedures] with a pregnant woman's right
to exercise control over the fate of her non-viable fetus." Id. The Appellate Divi-
sion continued by reasoning that the trial court's reliance on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976),
was erroneous because those cases involved a woman's "personal autonomy and
bodily integrity." Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857
(19920). The Appellate Division further stated that it was the fact of delayed im-
plantation that distinguished in vivo and in vitro fertilization. Id. at 586.
177 See id. at 586 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992)).
After discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the majority stated:
A woman's established right to exercise virtually exclusive control
over her own body is not implicated in the IVF scenario until such
time as implantation occurs, for it is only then that her bodily integ-
rity is at issue. Prior to implantation that interest is not a relevant
and appropriate consideration .... Id.
Similarly, the dissent stated: "My colleagues and I are in unani-
mous agreement with regard to two major issues. First, that the
Supreme Court erred in equating a woman's procreation right to
attain pregnancy via [IVFI with her right to bodily autonomy at-
tendant to an in vivo pregnancy." Id. at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting).
178 See id. at 587. The majority stated, "We are in full agreement with the
decision in Davis to the extent it requires that where a manifestation of mutual
intent exists between the parties, that intent must be given effect by the court." Id.
The dissent agreed, stating that "where parties have expressed their agreement by
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were divided as to whether the agreements between the Kasses and
the IVF clinic were sufficiently clear and definitive to bind the par-
ties.179 A two-judge plurality ultimately resolved this dispute based
upon contract law and enforced the contractual provisions of the
agreements. 80 The concurring justice, however, rejected the plu-
rality's contract theory by arguing that the informed consent docu-
ments were too ambiguous to rule in favor of either party. 81
Instead, the justice would have ruled for the husband using a veto
approach.' 82 Finally, a two-justice dissent, finding the informed
consent documents too ambiguous, adopted and significantly devel-
oped the balancing of interests approach established by the Davis
court.18 3
1. Plurality Opinion
A two-justice plurality held that the informed consent docu-
ments signed by the couple were evidence of their intent, upon disa-
greement over dispositional authority, to donate the frozen pre-
zygotes for research. 184 Since the informed consent documents pro-
contract, their intentions should control and that such agreements should be en-
couraged if not mandated." Id. at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting).
179 See id. at 589. The majority, however, conceded that "[e]ven if one provi-
sion of the informed consent document could rationally be perceived as creating
an ambiguity.., any such ambiguity may be resolved by reading that document as
a whole to determine its purpose and intent." But see id. at 591 (Friedmann, J.,
concurring) (noting that the informed consent documents became operative only
after the couple's association with the program had ended, either because the wife
bore a child or because the couple decided to terminate their participation in the
IVF program); Id. at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting) ("[a]lthough the parties did enter
into an 'informed consent' agreement, it failed to provide an unambiguous state-
ment of their intent").
180 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 585-88, 590 (ruling that there existed an "une-
quivocal statement of intent" embodied in the consent form that must be recog-
nized). This "intent" was also expressed in a subsequent uncontested divorce
agreement. Id. at 585.
181 See id. at 586, 591-94 (Friedmann, J., concurring).
182 See id. (stating that where there "is no reliable contract providing for the
disposition of the frozen pre-zygotes, the objecting party, except in the most excep-
tional circumstances, should be able to veto a former spouse's proposed
implantation").
183 See id. at 594-602 (Miller & Altman, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that the
analysis used in Davis should be utilized in the present case). See also Davis, 842
S.W. 2d 588 (the Davis analysis considered the relative positions of each party, the
burdens that different solutions will have on each party, and the interests of each
party).
184 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 587.
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vided that the pre-zygotes were to go to the IVF facility, that lan-
guage would control the outcome.185 The plurality reasoned that
the provision containing the divorce contingency was only in the
document to insulate the IVF program from liability in the event of
a divorce dispute. 186 Also, the plurality felt that the prior consent
documents signed by Maureen and Steven were the type of agree-
ments suggested by the court in Davis.187 Furthermore, the plural-
ity held that Maureen had not provided sufficient evidence to
establish any right to custody. 188 Consequently, the plurality would
not have applied the balancing test employed in Davis even if the
couple had no prior agreement.' 89 Finally, the plurality also found
the informed consent documents to be dispositive because the case
involved "intensely personal and essentially private matters [to be]
appropriately resolved by the prospective parents rather than the
courts."190
2. Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Judge Friedmann argued that the informed
consent agreements were too ambiguous as to the disposition of the
pre-zygotes in the event of the parties' disagreement.' 91 Judge
Friedmann reasoned that the informed consent agreements did not
provide "real insight into the intentions of ... [the] divorced par-
ties." 192 Judge Friedmann continued by stating that the informed
consent forms were "susceptible of multiple and conflicting inter-
pretations," and therefore, could not be relied upon to resolve the
dispute between Maureen and Steven.' 93 As such, Judge Fried-
mann asserted that the informed consent agreements should not be
the sole authority relied upon to resolve the frozen pre-embryos
dispute.1 94 In addition, Judge Friedmann rejected the strict balanc-
ing of interests test preferred by the Davis court and the Kass dis-
185 See id. at 588 (plurality opinion).
186 See id. at 589.
187 Id. See also Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 604, ("If their wishes cannot be ascer-
tained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreements concerning disposition
should be carried out.").
188 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 590.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See id. at 592 (Friedmann, J., concurring).
192 See id. at 591.
193 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 592.
194 See id. at 591.
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senters. 195 Instead, Judge Friedmann opined that absent an
agreement declaring the party's intentions, the "objecting party, ex-
cept in the most exceptional circumstances, should be able to veto a
former spouse's proposed implantation."' 96 Judge Friedmann did
not think that Maureen had proved such exceptional
circumstances.' 97
3. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion intimated that, as a matter of legal prin-
ciples, there is no difficulty with the use of contract law as an appro-
priate source for resolving embryo disposition disputes. 198 The
dissent, however, agreed with the concurrence's opinion that the
informed consent agreements were too ambiguous because it failed
to provide a clear statement of the parties' intent.199 Instead, the
dissent stated that the competing rights, equities, and circumstances
of both parties should be balanced.200 The record, however, did not
contain sufficient information to adequately balance the competing
195 See id. at 592 (Friedmann, J., concurring). The concurrence felt that the
strict balancing test could violate the Supreme Court's decision in Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), by allowing one person to
interfere with another person's decision not to have offspring before the point of
viability. Id.
196 See id. (relying on the constitutional principles involving the right to pro-
create and the right to avoid procreation). Some commentators have equated an
automatic veto to a "Double Consent Rule." See Alise R. Panitch, Note, The Da-
vis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles over Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 543, 543-72 (1991). "This approach would require obtaining consent twice
from each spouse - once when the IVF procedure is initiated and again before
each implantation." Id. "In the event that one spouse refuse[d] to consent at the
implantation stage, the preembryos would be automatically discarded" pursuant to
the automatic veto of the other partner. See id. But see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.
2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (expressly rejecting any veto power).
197 See id. at 593-94 (Friedmann, J., concurring) ("The plaintiff has effectively
proven on the instant record that she could not make the necessary showing of
exigency even if she were afforded the opportunity.").
198 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting).
199 See id. (disputing the plurality's contention that the "agreement in issue,
by any stretch of the imagination, reflects the intent of these parties to destroy
their pre-zygotes in the event of divorce"). "[I]n the case before us, although the
parties did enter into an 'informed consent' document, it failed to provide an un-
ambiguous statement of their intent." Id.
200 See id. The dissent stated, "[t]he immediate question before us is whether
the burdens of unwanted paternity of the 'would-not-be father' exceed the depri-
vation to the 'would-be-mother' in this case." Id. at 600.
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interests of the parties. 20' Finally, the dissent further indicated the
need for the intervention of the legislature to mandate that IVF
clinics require the execution of a standardized, binding agreement
that sets forth the parties' specific intentions in the event of a future
change in circumstances. 20 2 Nevertheless, the dissent would have
remanded the case to the trial court for an inquiry into the interests,
positions, and burdens of the parties. 20 3
D. The New York Court of Appeals Decision
Maureen appealed the Appellate Division's decision, and the
New York State Court of Appeals granted a stay to prevent de-
struction of the frozen pre-zygotes until it could decide the case. 204
The Court of Appeals then heard oral arguments on March 31,
1998.205 Finally, in May 1998, in a unanimous decision, the court
affirmed the plurality opinion of the Appellate Division.206 In its
decision, the court first held that Maureen's right of privacy and
bodily integrity were not implicated in the dispute over the frozen
pre-zygotes. 20 7 Furthermore, the frozen pre-zygotes would not be
recognized as persons for constitutional purposes. 208 The court rea-
soned that the parties had clearly intended that, in the event of a
divorce and disagreement, the pre-zygotes would be donated to the
IVF clinic for research. 20 9 Relying on the dicta in the Davis court,
the court held that "agreements between progenitors, or gamete
201 See id.
202 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 600 ("Ultimately it is for the Legislature to
enact such progressive laws.").
203 See id. at 599-602 (relying on the assertion of the Davis court that an
analysis should "consider the positions of the parties, the significance of their inter-
ests and the relative burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions" (quot-
ing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992))).
204 See N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 1997, at Al.
205 See Blaine Harden, N.Y. High Court to Decide Fate of Embryos that Sur-
vived Split, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1998, at A2.
206 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998), affg 663 N.Y.S. 2d 581
(2d Dep't 1997) ("We now affirm, agreeing with the plurality that the parties
clearly expressed their intent that in the circumstances presented the pre-zygotes
would be donated to the IVF program for research purposes.").
207 See id. at 179.
208 See id. See also Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 286 N.E.
2d 887, 888 (N.Y. 1972) (concluding that pre-zygotes do not enjoy protection as a
person under the New York Constitution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973)
(pre-zygotes are not persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, are
not entitled to constitutional protection under the federal law).
209 See Kass, 696 N.E. 2d at 180.
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donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally
be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute be-
tween them. ''21 ° The court concluded, based on analysis of contract
law, that the informed consent documents were clear and disposi-
tive.2Tt As such, the pre-zygotes would be donated to research if
the couple could not otherwise agree. 212 Finally, because the court
relied upon the informed consent documents, it found no need to
determine whether the pre-zygotes are entitled to "special
respect. "213
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The New York Court of Appeals' unanimous ruling that pre-
IVF agreements will generally be upheld is clearly a sound decision.
As Chief Justice Kaye noted in her opinion:
[P]roliferating cases regarding the disposition of em-
bryos, as well as other assisted reproductive issues, will
unquestionably spark further progression of the law.
What is plain, however, is the need for clear, consistent
principles to guide parties in protecting their interests
and resolving their disputes, and the need for particu-
lar care in fashioning such principles as issues are bet-
ter defined and appreciated.214
The decision in Kass v. Kass did exactly this - provide legal gui-
dance for adjudicating future disputes between ex-spouses concern-
ing their IVF created frozen embryos. The Court of Appeals
correctly resolved this dispute by concluding that "it is for the
progenitors, not the State and not the courts, who, by their prior
directives [should] make this [deeply personal] and difficult deci-
sion."12t 5 To support the Kass resolution, the American Medical
Association also recommends that IVF participants execute ad-
210 See id. at 180 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)).
211 See id. at 180-2 (applying "common-law principles governing contract
interpretation").
212 See id. See also Poole, supra note 88, at 93 (advocating a default rule that
embryos should not be implanted in the absence of an agreement between the
donors).
213 See Kass, 696 N.E. d at 179.
214 Id.
215 See id. at 180. See also The New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, Analysis and Recommendations for Pub-
lic Policy 316 (1.998) [herein "NY Task Force"].
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vance agreements addressing the dispositional authority over their
frozen embryos.216 In addition, the New York State Task Force on
Life and the Law further suggests that informed consent forms in-
clude advance directives, such as the right to embryo disposition in
the event of divorce. 217 After Kass was decided, a bill was intro-
duced in both the New York State Senate and Assembly, and sent
to the Senate and Assembly Committees on Health, which requires
IVF participants to specify, in a pre-IVF agreement, how to dispose
of additional embryos.218 To date, however, the bill has not been
approved.219 Nevertheless, although New York does not yet man-
date pre-IVF agreements statutorily, the New York courts will gen-
erally enforce such agreements in the event of a dispute between
the IVF couple. 220 For these reasons, the judicial system of the sev-
eral states should look to New York's affirmative position and rec-
ognize the legality and enforceability of embryo disposition
agreements.
A. Positive Implications
Legal scholars have argued that prior directives contained in
IVF contracts are similar to those of marriage contracts and of ad-
vance directives at death.221 As such, the contract framework uti-
lized in Kass encourages courts to merely focus on the rights of the
216 See David H. Fiestal, A Solomonic Decision: What Will Be The Fate of
Frozen Preembryos?, 6 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 109-10 n.50 (1999) (quoting
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Code of Medical
Ethics: Current Opinions with Annotations (1994)). The Council's opinion, in part,
stated:
"Advance agreements are recommended for deciding the disposi-
tion of frozen pre-embryos in the event of divorce or other changes
in circumstances. Advance agreements can help ensure that the
gamete providers undergo IVF and pre-embryo freezing after a full
contemplation of the consequences ... ." Id.
217 See NY Task Force, supra note 215, at 318.
218 The bill proposes to mandate the execution of written advance directives
for the disposition of frozen embryos by "individuals or couples who enter in vitro
programs or other assisted reproductive services." See S.B. 1120, 222nd Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1999); A.B. 1932, 222nd Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
219 See A.B. S00671, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (visited Jan. 23, 2001) http://
assembly.state.ny.us/cgi-bin/showbill?billnum=s00671.
220 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 244 (Consol. 2000) ("agreements... regarding
disposition of ... pre-zygotes[ ] should generally be presumed valid and binding
221 See John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Em-
bryos, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 407, 414 (1990).
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parties to the contract, rather than on the rights that the frozen em-
bryo may possess. 222 In addition, this pure contract approach en-
ables the courts to avoid deciding on the status of frozen embryos
and to focus solely on their future disposition.223 And furthermore,
by focusing on contract law, the enforcement of explicit agreements
enables the disputing ex-couple to avoid emotionally painful, costly,
and time-consuming litigation. 224 Finally, requiring the IVF couple
to make binding decisions at the outset of the IVF procedure would
prevent the courts, the state, or the IVF clinic from deciding a
purely private subject matter.225
B. Negative Implications
Notwithstanding the positive impact, the contract ruling in
Kass may be somewhat flawed for several reasons. Primarily, un-
less the pre-IVF agreements are clearly unambiguous, disputes over
disposition rights will continue to plague the judicial system. 226 For
example, the parties to the disposition agreements may not be fully
informed of their choices or understand the legal implications of
their decisions.227 Furthermore, the gap in time between the execu-
tion and the operation of the pre-IVF agreement does not address
the possibilities that a party's interests may eventually change.
More importantly, however, the IVF participants may not contem-
plate the full consequences of signing a pre-IVF agreement and the
agreement may be entered into under unconscionable circum-
stances. 228 Despite the few defects in the contract model, legisla-
222 See Mario J. Trespalacious, Frozen Embryos: Towards an Equitable Solu-
tion, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 826-27 (1992).
223 See Robertson, supra note 221, at 418.
224 See id.
225 See generally id.
226 See Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis, What About Future Disputes?,
26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 342-43 (1993) (recognizing that written agreements do not
always prevent disposition disputes).
227 See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Em-
bryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 465 (1990).
228 See A.Z., 725 N.E. 2d at 1054 (agreement similar to the one in Kass v.
Kass voided because the circumstances leading to the couple's dispute were unan-
ticipated when they first entered into the agreement); Christian v. Christian, 696
N.E. 2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977) (noting that courts will set aside an agreement if it is
deemed unconscionable); see also Lee Kuo, Comment, Lessons Learned from
Great Britain's Human Fertilization and Embryology Act: Should the United States
Regulate the Fate of Unused Frozen Embryos?, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J.
1027, 1033-34 (1997).
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tion mandating a clear, express, and unambiguous pre-IVF
agreement will cure these flaws and only reinforce the use of con-
tract law.2 29
C. Proposal
Despite the contract ruling in Kass, not all jurisdictions share
the same view as New York's highest court. For example, currently,
Florida is the only state that explicitly mandates pre-IVF procedure
agreements providing for the disposition of frozen embryos.230 As
such, the absence of clear, uniform legislation regarding the rights
and duties of the parties involved in the IVF procedure makes the
enforceability of pre-IVF agreements questionable.2 31 However,
only Congress, not the fertility clinics or the states, can resolve dis-
putes concerning disposition rights by enacting broad legislation.232
To avoid further confusion and inconsistency in disposition dis-
putes,2 33 this broad legislation should (a) clarify the legal status of
229 See infra Part IV-C and accompanying text.
230 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997). The Florida statute provides
that the couple and the IVF clinic must enter into a written agreement that pro-
vides for the disposition of the couple's embryos in the event of divorce, death, or
any other unforeseeable circumstances). Id. Absent a written agreement, the stat-
ute grants joint decision-making authority to the donors. Id. The Florida statute,
however, does not mention how to resolve disputes between the couple. See gener-
ally N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13 to 168-B:15, 168-B:18 (1994 & Supp. 1999)
(requiring IVF participants to undergo medical examinations and counseling and
imposing a fourteen-day limit for maintenance of pre-zygotes stored outside the
body).
231 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 594. In his dissent, Justice Miller noted that the
"legal, emotional, and ethical nightmare" resulting from frozen embryo disputes
"demonstrates the need for legislation mandating that [IVF] clinics require the
execution of a standardized, binding agreement" stating the parties' specific inten-
tions "in the event [there is a] change[ ] in circumstances.").
232 If the states regulate this issue, there is a "danger for a greater disparity in
the laws." Kristine E. Luongo, Comment, The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the
Protection of "Potential Life"?, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1011, 1052 (1995). There-
fore, a federally appointed body of medical and legal experts should recommend to
Congress uniform national legislation. See Dan Fabricant, Note, International Law
Revisited: Davis v. Davis and the Need for Coherent Policy on the Status of the
Embryo, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 173, 199, 206-07 (1990).
233 See Jean Voutsinas, In Vitro Fertilization, 12 PROB. L.J. 47, 68-70 (1994).
The agreements "minimize the frequency and cost of resolving disputes over the
disposition of the preembryo." Id. at 61.
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frozen embryos;234 (b) affirm the gamete providers' decisional au-
thority over their cryopreserved embryos; (c) provide a detailed list
of all possible options available to the IVF participants concerning
excess frozen embryos; (d) mandate all IVF programs to obtain
from IVF patients, prior to any reproductive treatment, written
agreements governing the future disposition of their embryos;235 (e)
and, ensure the enforceability of such prior directives. Absent a
prior agreement, the courts should prohibit the use and/or release
of the frozen embryos to either party without the consent of the
other.236
CONCLUSION
Although one, concrete model defining the legal status of fro-
zen embryos has yet to be determined, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has made it abundantly clear that the judicial system need not
determine the status of embryos.237 The Kass decision firmly estab-
lished what the Davis court set out to do - that prior directives are
the key to resolving disputes between ex-spouses concerning the
disposition of their frozen embryos.238 According to Kass princi-
ples, private agreements regarding embryo disposition are legal and
must be enforced in a court of law. 239 In essence, the Court of Ap-
peals stated "it's too bad - you signed, you sealed, now we (the
court) will deliver."
However, by failing to determine whether frozen embryos are
property, human beings, or something in between, the Court of Ap-
peals did not avail itself of the unique opportunity to take a firm
234 But see Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (stating that pre-zygotes are not persons
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, are not entitled to constitutional
protection under the federal law).
235 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (mandating that the couple and the IVF
clinic enter into a written agreement providing for the disposition of the couple's
embryos in the event of divorce, death, or any other unforeseeable circumstances).
236 See id. Absent a written agreement, the Florida statute grants joint deci-
sion-making authority to the donors. Id. The statute, however, does not mention
how to resolve disputes between the couple.
237 See Kass, 696 N.E. 2d at 179.
238 Although there was no agreement, the Davis court recognized that the
existence of a prior agreement might have eliminated the need to determine the
legal status of pre-embryos. See Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 590 (noting that two critical
factors were missing that potentially could have influenced the outcome of the
case: (1) the existence of a written agreement regarding the disposition of the pre-
embryos; and (2) statutory law governing disposition).
239 See supra Part III and accompanying text.
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position in an inconsistent area of law.240 As a result, the Kass res-
olution will not always pass "with flying colors." Primarily, the
Kass court failed to consider situations in which consent forms are
not indicative of the parties' current intentions, that is, where the
interests of one party eventually changes. More importantly, the
Kass court also failed to consider situations in which the parties
dispute the disposition rights over frozen embryos absent an agree-
ment setting forth their intentions. Notwithstanding the court's fail-
ure to consider these situations, the enactment of clear federal
legislation)241 will surely address the Court of Appeals' oversights,
while only reinforcing the court's ingenious "trail-blazing" prece-
dent. The Court of Appeals holding, therefore, clearly speaks of
New York's strong commitment to freedom of contract and the use
of contract law as the correct model to resolve disputes over em-
bryo disposition.
Luigi Brandimarte
240 See York, 717 F. Supp. 421 (pre-embryos are considered property); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN §§ 9:121-130 ("human life" status accorded to pre-embryos); Da-
vis, 842 S.W. 2d 588 (court grants "special respect" status to pre-embryos); Kass,
696 N.E. 2d at 179 (court avoids deciding the status of pre-embryos and relies on
an informed consent document to resolve the disposition rights of the ex-spouses).
See also supra Part III and accompanying text.
241 E.g., legislation clarifying the legal status of frozen embryos, affirming the
IVF participants' rights over their frozen embryos, providing options available to
the gamete providers concerning additional frozen embryos, mandating pre-IVF
agreements between the IVF participants and also between the IVF participants
and the doctor/clinic, and ensuring the enforceability of such agreements. See
supra Part IV-C and accompanying text.

